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WHAT IS ORIGINALISM? THE EVOLUTION OF 
CONTEMPORARY ORIGINALIST THEORY 
Lawrence B. Solum 
I. Introduction 
Debates over “originalism” have been a central focus of contemporary 
constitutional theory for three decades. One of the features of this debate has 
been disagreement about what “originalism” is. More worrisome is the 
possibility that the arguments between contemporary originalists and their 
opponents, the “living constitutionalists”, are confused – with each side of the 
debate making erroneous assumptions about the content of their opponent’s 
theories. 
The aim of this chapter is to clarify these debates by providing a history 
of contemporary originalism and then developing an account of the core or 
focal content of originalist theory. The history reveals that contemporary 
originalist theory has evolved – the mainstream of originalist theory began 
with an emphasis on the original intentions of the framers but has gradually 
moved to the view that the “original meaning” of the constitution is the 
“original public meaning” of the text. Even today, originalists disagree among 
themselves about a variety of important questions, including the normative 
justification for a constitutional practice that adheres to original meaning. 
Despite evolution and continued disagreement, however, contemporary 
originalist theory has a core of agreement on two propositions. First, almost 
all originalists agree that the linguistic meaning of each constitutional 
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provision was fixed at the time that provision was adopted. Second, 
originalists agree that our constitutional practice both is (albeit imperfectly) 
and should be committed to the principle that the original meaning of the 
Constitution constrains judicial practice. The question whether living 
constitutionalists actually disagree with these core principles of originalist 
theory is a complex one – to which we shall return at the end of this chapter. 
II. A Word About the Word: The Origins of “Originalism”
The first appearance of the term “originalism” in Westlaw’s database of legal 
periodicals is found in an article by Paul Brest in 1981,1 but Brest had used 
both “originalism” and “originalist” in 19802 (in an article that is not included 
in the data base). So far as Brest knows, he coined the word.3 Here is how 
Brest defined “originalism”: 
By “originalism” I mean the familiar approach to constitutional adjudication that 
accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the intentions of its 
adopters.4 
The disjunctive “or” in the last clause of Brest’s definition presaged a 
debate among originalists, but what is most striking about this passage is 
Brest’s assumption that his audience already understood the features of the 
view that he was about to criticize. Brest’s neologism caught on, and the 
words “originalism” and “originalist” appear frequently from 1981 onward.5 
1 Paul Brest, “The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions 
of Normative Constitutional Scholarship”, 90 Yale L.J. 1063 at 1090 (1981). 
2 Paul Brest, “The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding”, 60 B.U.L. 
Rev. 204 at 234 (1980) [Brest, “Misconceived Quest”]. 
3 Email exchange between Lawrence B. Solum and Paul Brest, December 2, 2009. 
4 Brest, “Misconceived Quest”, supra note 2 at 204. 
5 For example, a search on Google’s Books Ngram Viewer reveals no use of the 
term before 1980 and a steady increase in use of the word “originalism” in books 
published after the early 1980s. See 
http://ngrams.googlelabs.com/graph?content=Originalism&year_start=1975&year_
end=2008&corpus=0&smoothing=3 (search for “originalism” from 1975 to 2008 in 
the “English” database on Google Books). 
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Whatever the origins of the terms “originalism” and “originalist,” 
scholarly usage of related phrases extends at least as far back as the 1930s. 
The phrase “original meaning” was used in the constitutional context in a 
Yale Law Journal article in 1938 discussing the controversy over “substantive 
due process”: 
There would be far greater advantage in restoring the original meaning of the 
‘privileges and immunities’ clause and by the process of inclusion and exclusion 
letting the country know what are now federal privileges, than in forcing the court to 
draw upon the fathomless depths of the ‘due process’ clause to give effect to their 
personal convictions of economic and social propriety.6 
It is perhaps no coincidence that the original meaning of the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause continues to hold the constitutional stage 70 years later. 
The related phrase “original intentions” appeared in 1938, in a closely 
related context: 
Wholly apart from Bingham’s personal understanding of his phraseology, his original 
intentions in drafting it, or the relations existing between the Cleveland and Mahoning 
Railroad and other members of the Joint Committee, it is possible that Reverdy 
Johnson, in the course of the Committee’s deliberations, or perhaps even in private 
conversation with Conkling, mentioned Justice Grier’s decision as among the most 
recent involving the due process clause, and in this manner precipitated a frank 
discussion of the entire problem of corporate rights.7 
And “original understanding” made its first appearance in the Westlaw 
database in a well-known 1949 article by Charles Fairman.8 
Judicial usage of the “originalism” and the associated phrases “original 
meaning,” “original intentions,” and “original understanding” in a 
6 Edwin Borchard, “The Supreme Court and Private Rights” 47 Yale L.J. 1051 at
1063 (1938). 
7 Howard Jay Graham, “The “Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment” 
48 Yale L.J. 171 at 189–90 (1938) (citation omitted). 
8 Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of 
Rights?: The Original Understanding” 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 at 5 (1949) (exploring the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s clauses “at the time the Amendment was 
adopted”). 
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constitutional context seems to post-date academic usage. The first use of the 
phrase “original meaning” in the text (exclusive of citations) of an opinion by 
a Supreme Court Justice occurred in Justice Black’s dissent in Harper v. 
Virginia State Bd. of Elections9 in 1966: 
Since the Breedlove and Butler cases were decided the Federal Constitution has not 
been amended in the only way it could constitutionally have been, that is, as provided 
in Article V of the Constitution. I would adhere to the holding of those cases. The 
Court, however, overrules Breedlove in part, but its opinion reveals that it does so not 
by using its limited power to interpret the original meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause, but by giving that clause a new meaning which it believes represents a better 
governmental policy. From this action I dissent.10 
 
The first similar occurrence of “original meaning” in a majority opinion 
occurs in a footnote in Justice Powell’s 1977 opinion for the Court in 
Ingraham v. Wright.11 “Original understanding” made its first similar 
appearance in Justice Harlan’s 1970 dissent and concurrence in Oregon v. 
Mitchell.12 “Original intentions” first occurs in Justice Berger’s 1983 dissent 
in Solem v. Helm.13 The term “originalist” first occurred in Justice Scalia’s 
1995 dissenting opinion in Roper v. Simmons,14 and “originalism” made its 
first appearance in Justice Stevens’ 2005 dissenting opinion in Van Orden v. 
Perry.15 
 
The word “originalism” is a neologism–a word that was coined for the 
purpose of carving up theoretical space. Brest’s original usage introduced an 
ambiguity by referring to “text” or “intentions.” In addition, Brest’s new word 
resonated–presumably this was deliberate–with other phrases with long 
histories of usage in a variety of legal contexts (“original meaning,” “original 
                                                
9 383 U.S. 663 at 671 (1966) 
10 Ibid.. at 671-2. 
11 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 at 670 n. 39 (1977). 
12 400 U.S. 112 at 165 (1970). 
13 463 U.S. 277 at 310 (1983). 
14 543 U.S. 551 at 626 (1977). 
15 545 U.S. 677 at 729 (2005). 
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understanding,” and “original intention”). Moreover, Brest used the terms 
“originalism” and “originalist” in order to refer to a position that he was 
criticizing. Brest’s term caught on, and eventually was adopted by proponents 
of the views that had affinities with the object of his critique. As a 
consequence, the words “originalism” and “originalist” are ambiguous–used 
by scholars, lawyers, judges, and the public in a variety of different ways. It 
seems likely that as a matter of lexicography, “originalism” is a family 
resemblance term–with several overlapping senses. 
 
This deep ambiguity in the meaning of originalism is further 
complicated by the sociology of the legal academy and the politics of judicial 
interpretation. Legal theorists who self-identify as originalists are likely to 
strive to police the boundaries of the “originalism,” seeking to exclude 
implausible views and to focus debate on the versions of originalism that they 
believe are true, correct, or most reasonable. Legal theorists who oppose 
originalism may have precisely the opposite motivation, seeking to identify 
originalism with its least defensible variations. Political champions of 
originalism are likely to focus on simplified “sound bite” versions of the 
theory that conflate the content of originalist theory with the goals it seeks to 
achieve: “Originalism is the theory that judges should follow the law and not 
make it.” Likewise, political opponents might define originalism as a view 
that is obviously unpalatable: “Originalism is anti-woman.” 
 
For all these reasons, the road to conceptual clarity in debates about 
originalism will be rocky. The quest for agreement on a single definition of 
originalism is likely to prove Quixotic. For this reason, stipulated definitions 
of originalism should be avoided. Readers of theoretical texts are imperfect, 
and the stipulated meaning of “originalism” is likely to be ignored or 
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forgotten. A more promising approach should begin with the facts. 
“Originalism” is an ambiguous theoretical term. There is a family of 
originalist constitutional theories. In order to make progress in the debates 
about “originalism,” we will need to map the theoretical space, identifying the 
ways in which different versions of originalism vary and the ways in which 
they resemble one another. 
 
III. A Very Short History of Contemporary Originalist Theory 
The first step towards an answer to the question, “What is originalism?,” was 
an investigation of the origins of the word “originalism.” The second step is a 
history of the theories that are associated with that word. The history that is 
offered here is necessarily brief, partial, and incomplete. A complete version 
of the story would require a long monograph. The aim of the very short 
history in Part III is to identify the most important theoretical developments, 
with an emphasis on the developments that are most relevant to the current 
state of originalist theory.16 
A. Original intentions of the framers 
Contemporary debates about originalism trace back to the early 1970s. In 
1971 Robert Bork wrote “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems”,17 an article that is sometimes considered the opening move in the 
development of contemporary originalist theory. Bork’s essay was only 
                                                
16 For a different view from an earlier time, see Daniel A. Farber, “The Originalism 
Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed”, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085 at 1085 (1989) (offering 
a concise “tourist guide” introduction to the “original intent” debate).   
17  Robert H. Bork, “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems”, 47 
Ind. L.J. 1 (1971). 
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loosely “originalist” in the contemporary senses of that term. The following 
passage is representative: 
There appear to be two proper methods of deriving rights from the Constitution. The 
first is to take from the document rather specific values that text or history show the 
framers actually to have intended and which are capable of being translated into 
principled rules. We may call these specified rights. The second method derives rights 
from governmental processes established by the Constitution. These are secondary or 
derived individual rights. This latter category is extraordinarily important. This 
method of derivation is essential to the interpretation of the first amendment, to voting 
rights, to criminal procedure and to much else.18 
 
The emphasis on “text” and “history” is recognizably originalist, but 
Bork’s notion of “derived rights” is not clearly anchored in original meaning 
or original intentions. 
 
In 1976, then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist authored “The 
Notion of a Living Constitution”, which, based on the writings of the 
Framers, explicitly criticized living constitutionalism and implicitly endorsed 
originalism.19 A year later, in 1977, Raoul Berger penned Government by 
Judiciary,20 which argued that the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment were contrary to the original intentions of its 
Framers. In 1985, then-Attorney General Edwin Meese put originalism on the 
political agenda in a well-publicized speech before the American Bar 
Association.21 Meese’s speech included the following passage: 
                                                
18 Ibid. at 17. 
19  William H. Rehnquist, “The Notion of a Living Constitution”, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 
693 (1976). 
20  Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary (1977). 
21  See Edwin Meese III, “Speech Before the American Bar Association” (July 9, 
1985), reprinted in The Great Debate: Interpreting Our Written Constitution (Paul 
G. Cassel ed., 1986), online:< http://www.fed-soc.org/resources/id.49/default.asp> 
[Meese, “Speech Before the American Bar Association”]; see also Edwin Meese 
III, “The Case for Originalism”, The Heritage Foundation (June 6, 2005) 
online:<http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed060605a.cfm>; Lynette 
Clemetson, “Meese’s Influence Looms in Today’s Judicial Wars”, N.Y. Times, Apr. 
17, 2005, at A1.  
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In reviewing a term of the Court, it is important to take a moment and reflect upon the 
proper role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional system. The intended role of 
the judiciary generally and the Supreme Court in particular was to serve as the 
“bulwarks of a limited constitution.” The judges, the Founders believed, would not 
fail to regard the Constitution as “fundamental law” and would “regulate their 
decisions” by it. As the “faithful guardians of the Constitution,” the judges were 
expected to resist any political effort to depart from the literal provisions of the 
Constitution. The text of the document and the original intention of those who framed 
it would be the judicial standard in giving effect to the Constitution.22 
 
Bork, Rehnquist, Berger, and Meese did not develop anything that 
approaches a full-blown constitutional theory, but their views suggested 
something like the theory we now call “original intentions originalism,” the 
view that the original intentions of the Framers should guide constitutional 
interpretation. 
 
B. The misconceived quest and the original understanding of original 
intentions 
Following Berger’s book, but five years before Meese’s speech, Paul Brest 
wrote “The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding”,23 one of the 
most cited and influential contributions to constitutional theory.24 Brest’s 
article advanced a variety of criticisms of original intentions originalism, 
including: (1) the difficulty of ascertaining the institutional intention of a 
multimember body in general;25 (2) the particular problems associated with 
identifying the intention of the members of the Philadelphia Convention and 
the various state ratifying conventions in the case of the original Constitution 
and of Congress and the various state legislatures in the case of 
                                                
22  Meese, Speech Before the American Bar Association, ibid. 
23  Brest, “Misconceived Quest”, supra note 2. 
24  A Westlaw search of the JLR database for the string corresponding to the title 
yielded 719 hits on November 10, 2008.   
25  Brest, “Misconceived Quest”, supra note 2 at 214. 
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amendments;26 (3) the problem of determining the level of generality or 
specificity of the Framers’ and ratifiers’ intentions;27 (4) the problem of 
inferring intentions from constitutional structure;28 (5) the difficulty of 
translating the Framers’ and ratifiers’ beliefs and values given changes in 
circumstances over time;29 (6) the problem of the democratic legitimacy – that 
is, that the Constitution of 1789 was drafted and ratified without the 
participation of women and slaves;30 and (7) the problem of instability, in that 
an inflexible constitutional order cannot adapt to changing circumstances.31 
Brest had much more to say, and there were many other critics of originalism, 
but this list is sufficient to illustrate the reception that originalism received 
from constitutional theorists in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
 
Brest also raised the problem of the Framers’ and ratifiers’ interpretive 
intentions,32 and his remarks anticipated Jefferson Powell’s 1985 article, “The 
Original Understanding of Original Intent”.33 Powell’s article interrogated the 
assumption that original intentions originalists believed that the Framers’ 
themselves expected that the Constitution would be interpreted to conform to 
their intentions. Although Powell conceded that there were references to 
“original intention” and “intent of the framers” in the constitutional discourse 
of the Founding era, he argued that those phrases did not represent an early 
version of original intentions originalism. Instead, he argued that “[t]he 
Philadelphia framers’ primary expectation regarding constitutional 
                                                
26  Ibid. at 214–15. 
27  Ibid. at 216–17. 
28  Ibid. at 217-18. 
29  Ibid. at 219-22. 
30  Ibid. at 230. 
31  Ibid. at 231. 
32  Ibid. at 215-16. 
33  H. Jefferson Powell, “The Original Understanding of Original Intent”, 98 Harv. 
L. Rev. 885 (1985). 
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interpretation was that the Constitution, like any other legal document, would 
be interpreted in accord with its express language.”34 Both the evidence for 
Powell’s thesis and its implications are controversial, but its effect on 
scholarly opinion was profound. The strongest implication of the article is 
that original intentions originalism is a self-effacing theory because it requires 
that the Framers’ intentions regarding interpretation be respected, but those 
intentions require that the Framers’ intentions be disregarded. 
 
Brest and Powell were hardly the only critics of original intentions 
originalism, but their arguments, combined with others, were important in 
forming the scholarly consensus of the era.35 Essentially, that consensus 
accepted the claim that the original intentions of the Framers could not serve 
as the basis for a viable theory of constitutional interpretation and 
construction.36 
 
C. Original understanding of the ratifiers 
During this period, the originalism debate took a brief detour into a variant of 
original intentions originalism that emphasized the understandings37 or 
                                                
34  Ibid. at 903.  
35  This is not an intellectual history of the originalism debates, and I am not 
claiming that either Brest or Powell articulated the first or best version of the 
claims they made.  No string cite can do justice to the literature.  There were many 
influential critics of original intentions originalism; one of the most important was 
Ronald Dworkin.  See Ronald Dworkin, “The Forum of Principle”, 56 N.Y.U. L. R. 
Rev. 469 at 470 (1981). 
36 Randy E. Barnett, “An Originalism for Nonoriginalists”, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 611 
(1999) (“The received wisdom among law professors is that originalism is dead.”) 
[Barnett, “An Originalism for Nonoriginalists”]. 
37  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional 
Meaning”, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1275 at 1317 (1996) (defining “originalism” as “the 
theory that the original understanding of those who wrote and ratified various 
constitutional provisions determines their current meaning”) [Fallon, “Manageable 
Standards”]. 
 11 
intentions of the ratifiers – either the state ratifying conventions understood as 
corporate bodies or of the individuals who attended the ratifying conventions 
and voted in favor of ratification.38 
 
We need not tarry long over this twist in the debate. The move to 
ratifiers’ understanding or intent is best understood in conjunction with 
popular sovereignty as a justification for originalism. The ratifiers, rather than 
the Framers, could plausibly be viewed as expressing the political will of “We 
the People.” However, all of the problems that attended the equation of 
constitutional meaning with Framers’ intent seem to attach to ratifiers’ intent. 
Moreover, evidence may be even more difficult to obtain39 and the problems 
of group intention – of multiple conventions with multiple members – even 
more confounding with respect to ratifiers’ intent. To the extent that the 
ratifiers’ understanding is rooted in the public meaning, the emphasis on 
ratifiers is merely a way station on the journey from original intentions to 
original public meaning.40 
                                                
38  See Charles A. Miller, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History (1969) at 
157-88 (arguing that originalism should look to the intent of the ratifiers as well as 
of the Framers); see also Charles A. Lofgren, “The Original Understanding of 
Original Intent”, 5 Const. Comment. 77 at 113 (1988) (“Indeed, it is not too much 
to say that at least some of the founders saw the ratifiers’ historical or subjective 
intent as a check on constructions which cut loose from the original understandings 
of the sovereign people.”). 
39  See Henry P. Monaghan, “Our Perfect Constitution”, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 at 
375 n.130 (1981) (“Although the intention of the ratifiers, not the Framers, is in 
principle decisive, the difficulties of ascertaining the intent of the ratifiers leaves 
little choice but to accept the intent of the Framers as a fair reflection of it.”). 
40  Similar points could be made about what might be called “popular meaning,” the 
view that the relevant intentions or understandings should be those of “We the 
People” or the popular sovereign—the relevant actor for popular constitutionalism.  
If the relevant intentions are those of each and every citizen, then popular 
constitutionalism suffers from compounded versions of the ills that afflict 
intentionalism.  If popular constitutionalism points to public meaning, then it is 
simply another version of original-meaning originalism.  For discussion of popular 
constitutionalism, see Larry Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular 
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2004); see also Larry Alexander & 
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D. We the people 
The year before Meese gave his speech to the American Bar Association and 
Jefferson Powell wrote about the original understanding of original intent, 
Bruce Ackerman delivered his Storrs Lectures, entitled “Discovering the 
Constitution”, at Yale Law School.41 It was in these lectures that Ackerman’s 
theory of constitutional politics made its first wide impression on the 
community of constitutional scholars. Ackerman’s theory distinguishes 
ordinary politics – what happens when state legislatures and Congress enact 
statutes, for example – from constitutional politics. Here is the very first 
statement of Ackerman’s view, dualism, in the second lecture: 
[T]he Federalist elaborates a dualistic conception of political life. One form of 
political action – I shall call it constitutional politics – is characterized by Publian 
appeals to the common good, ratified by a mobilized mass of American citizens 
expressing their assent through extraordinary institutional forms. Although 
constitutional politics is the highest kind of politics, it should be permitted to 
dominate the nation’s life only during rare periods of heightened political 
consciousness. During the long periods between these constitutional moments, a 
second form of activity – I shall call it normal politics – prevails. Here, factions try to 
manipulate the constitutional forms of political life to pursue their own narrow 
interests. Normal politics must be tolerated in the name of individual liberty; it is, 
however, democratically inferior to the intermittent and irregular politics of public 
virtue associated with moments of constitutional creation.42 
 
Ackerman’s theory served as an answer to Alexander Bickel’s 
countermajoritarian difficulty: the problem of democratic legitimacy that 
attends judicial review by unelected judges.43 Judges as faithful agents of the 
“We the People,” who legislate in rare constitutional moments – or later 
                                                                                                             
Lawrence B. Solum, “Popular?  Constitutionalism?”, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1594 
(2005) (book review). 
41  Bruce A. Ackerman, “The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution”, 93 
Yale L.J. 1013 (1984) [Ackerman, “Discovering the Constitution”]. 
42  Ibid. at 1022–23 (citations omitted). 
43  See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme 
Court at the Bar of Politics (1962); see also Kenneth D. Ward & Cecilia R. 
Castillo, eds., The Judiciary and American Democracy: Alexander Bickel, the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty and Contemporary Constitutional Theory (2005). 
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“periods” – act more democratically than do legislators, who serve special 
interests and escape the people’s attention during the extended periods of 
ordinary politics. 
 
As developed in the Storrs Lectures, Ackerman’s theory focused on 
three constitutional moments: the Founding (the Constitution of 1789), 
Reconstruction (the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments), and 
the New Deal. Here is the initial appearance of that idea in the lectures: 
Speaking schematically, this historical story is dominated by three peaks of 
high importance that tower over valleys full of more particular meanings. The first 
peak, of course, is the Founding itself: the framing of the original Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights, Marbury v. Madison and McCulloch v. Maryland. The second peak is 
constituted by the legal events surrounding the Civil War: the judicial failure in Dred 
Scott and the constitutional affirmations of the Civil War Amendments. The third 
peak centers around the legitimation of the activist welfare state: the long Progressive 
struggle against judicial resistance and the dramatic capitulation by the Old Court 
before the New Deal in 1937. Time and again, we return to these moments; the 
lessons we learn from them control the meanings we give to our present constitutional 
predicaments.44 
 
Because Ackerman’s theory purported to legitimize progressive New 
Deal constitutionalism, his view might have been construed as the polar 
opposite of originalism, but at a deep level, Ackerman’s theory seemed to 
require an account of original meaning. Without employing original meaning, 
judicial enforcement of the Constitution could not be legitimized by 
democratic constitutional politics. In other words, a theory of original 
meaning is required for constitutional content to be determined by “We the 
People.” 
 
Ackerman’s development of popular sovereignty theory has been 
extraordinarily influential, and others have contributed important work in this 
                                                
44  Ackerman, “Discovering the Constitution”, supra note 41 at 1051–52. 
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vein,45 prominently Akhil Reed Amar,46 Ackerman’s colleague at Yale Law 
School. Cass Sunstein has described Amar’s position in the following terms: 
[I]n the law schools the most influential originalist may be Akhil Reed Amar, 
an ingenious and prolific scholar at Yale Law School. Describing himself as a 
“textualist” who is interested in history, Amar is methodologically quite close to 
Scalia. He is intensely interested in the text and in the historical record, and he is 
generally searching for the original meaning of contested terms. Amar wishes to know 
what the Constitution “really means,” and he puts that question as if it were largely or 
entirely a matter of excavation.47 
 
Although Sunstein’s interpretation of Amar is surely plausible, 
characterizing Ackerman and Amar’s theoretical position in originalist terms 
is problematic, in no small part because they both eschew explicit theorizing 
about constitutional interpretation. Nevertheless, even if Ackerman and Amar 
do not describe their views as originalist, it is clear that their approaches to 
the Constitution, which emphasize popular sovereignty and the constitutional 
text, have had both direct and indirect influences over contemporary 
theoretical debates explicitly concerned with originalism.48 
 
                                                
45  See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, “A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment”, 
60 Stan. L. Rev. 895 (2007) [Lash, “A Textual Historical Theory”]; Kurt T. Lash, 
“Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis”, 93 Va. L. Rev. 
1437 (2007) [Lash, “Originalism”]. 
46  See Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography (2005); Akhil Reed 
Amar, The Bill of Rights (1998). 
47  Cass R. Sunstein, “Originalism for Liberals”, The New Republic, Sept. 28, 1998, 
at 31, online: <http://home.uchicago.edu/~csunstei/originalism.html> (reviewing 
Amar, The Bill of Rights, ibid, and Akhil Reed Amar & Alan Hirsch, For the 
People (1998)). 
48  Thus, it is no accident that Amar and Ackerman’s students describe themselves 
as originalists.  See, e.g., Lash, “A Textual-Historical Theory”, supra note 45 at 
900 (“I will consider the historical record and attempt to identify which of the 
possible textual meanings are more or less plausible, given historical evidence of 
original public understanding.  In this way, I hope to provide an account of the 
Ninth Amendment satisfactory in terms of both originalism and textualism.”). 
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E. Original public meaning and the new originalism 
This sets the stage for what is sometimes called “the New Originalism”49 and 
is also labeled “Original Public Meaning Originalism.”50 Whatever the actual 
origins of this theory, the conventional story identifies Justice Antonin Scalia 
as having a key role. As early as 1986, Scalia gave a speech exhorting 
originalists to “change the label from the Doctrine of Original Intent to the 
Doctrine of Original Meaning.”51 The phrase “original public meaning” seems 
to have entered the contemporary theoretical debates through the work of 
Gary Lawson,52 with Steven Calabresi as another “early adopter.”53 The core 
idea of the revised theory is that the original meaning of the Constitution is 
the original public meaning of the constitutional text. 
 
Randy Barnett54 and Keith Whittington55 have played prominent roles in 
the development of the “New Originalism.” Both Barnett and Whittington 
base their theories on a foundation of “original public meaning,” but they 
build upon the views of Scalia and Lawson in a variety of interesting ways. 
                                                
49  See, e.g., Keith Whittington, “The New Originalism”, 2 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 
599 (2004).   
50  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, “An Originalism for Nonoriginalists” supra note 36.   
51  Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on 
Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in Original Meaning 
Jurisprudence: A Sourcebook 101 at 106 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice ed., 1987); see also 
Caleb Nelson, “Originalism and Interpretive Conventions”, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519 
at 554–55 (2003) (noting that most originalists have accepted Justice Scalia’s 
suggestion). 
52  See Gary Lawson, “Proving the Law”, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 859 at 875 (1992).  
For extended discussions of “original public meaning,” see Vasan Kesavan & 
Michael Stokes Paulson, “The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret 
Drafting History”, 91 Geo. L.J. 1113 at 1127 (2003); Samuel T. Morison, “The 
Crooked Timber of Liberal Democracy”, 2005 Mich. St. L. Rev. 461 at 465. 
53  See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, “The President’s Power to 
Execute the Laws”, 104 Yale L.J. 541 at 553 (1994). 
54  See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution (2004). 
55  See Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction (1999); Keith E. 
Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation (1999). 
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For the purposes of this very brief survey, perhaps their most important move 
is to embrace the distinction between “constitutional interpretation,” 
understood as the enterprise of discerning the semantic content of the 
Constitution, and “constitutional construction,” which we might tentatively 
define as the activity of determining the legal effect of the constitutional text.  
One mode of construction involves judicial specification of constitutional 
doctrine when the text is vague, but construction can take place in the 
political branches as well.56 This distinction explicitly acknowledges what we 
might call the fact of constitutional underdeterminacy: the original meaning 
of the text does not fully determine constitutional doctrine or its application to 
particular cases.57 With this turn, original-meaning originalists explicitly 
embrace the idea that when the original public meaning of the text “runs out,” 
application of the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text to a particular 
dispute must be guided by something other than original meaning. 
 
Once originalist theory (in some important instantiations) had 
acknowledged that vague constitutional provisions required construction, this 
step opened the door for reconciliation between originalism and living 
constitutionalism. The key figure in that reconciliation has been Jack Balkin 
through his influential 2006 and 2007 essays “Abortion and Original 
                                                
56  Another important early adopter of this distinction (in the context of 
constitutional theory) was Robert Clinton.  See Robert N. Clinton, “Original 
Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of ‘This Constitution’”,72 
Iowa L. Rev. 1177 (1987). 
57  See Lawrence B. Solum, “Semantic and Normative Originalism: Comments on 
Brian Leiter’s ‘Justifying Originalism’” Legal Theory Blog, Oct. 30, 2007, 
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2007/10/semantic-and-no.html> (observing 
that conventional semantic meaning of a text can underdetermine its application in 
several ways); cf. Lawrence B. Solum, “On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing 
Critical Dogma”, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 462 (1987) (distinguishing determinacy, 
indeterminacy, and underdeterminacy). 
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Meaning”58 and “Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption”.59 In 
these essays, Balkin argued for a reconciliation of original-meaning 
originalism with living constitutionalism according to a theory that might be 
called “the method of text and principle.” The meaning of the “text” provides 
a constraining framework within which constitutional “principles” operate. 
One understanding of Balkin’s view is that the “text” requires interpretation 
and the “principles” are matters of constitutional construction. 
 
Predating much of the American work on the New Originalism was 
Jeffrey Goldsworthy’s work, addressing the Australian Constitution, but 
developed with an explicit awareness of the theoretical debates swirling 
around American constitutionalism. Goldsworthy’s first major statement, 
“Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation”,60 was published in an 
Australian law review in 1997. As Goldsworthy’s work illustrates, 
innovations in American constitutional theory may have been anticipated 
elsewhere and American theorists have no monopoly on the creation of new 
(or the resurrection of old) theoretical constructs. 
 
F. Original applications and original methods 
Two very recent ideas deserve particular mention: “original 
applications” and “original methods.” The phrase “original applications” or 
                                                
58  Jack M. Balkin, “Abortion and Original Meaning”, 24 Const. Comment. 291 
(2007) [Balkin, “Abortion”]. 
59  Jack M. Balkin, “Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption”, 24 Const. 
Comment. 427 (2007) [Balkin, “Original Meaning”]. 
60  Jeffrey Goldsworthy, “Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation”, (1997) 25 
Fed. L. Rev. 1; and Jeffrey Goldsworthy, “The Case for Originalism” in this 
volume. See also Lawrence B. Solum, “Goldsworthy on the New Originalism”, 
Legal Theory Blog, Nov. 2, 2007, online: 
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2007/11/goldsworthy-on-.html>. 
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“original expected applications” seems to originate with Jack Balkin,61 but 
Mark Greenberg and Harry Litman articulated similar distinctions between 
“original meaning” and “original practices” and “meaning” and “application” 
in their important 1998 article, “The Meaning of Original Meaning”.62 
Although Greenberg and Litman deserve the credit for the deepest and most 
thorough discussion of the issues, my account here will focus on Balkin’s 
formulation, which brings the idea of original expected applications into the 
New Originalism, not as a component but rather by way of exclusion. 
Greenberg and Litman saw their point primarily as a criticism of originalism; 
Balkin sees the same issue, but concludes that originalism is strengthened by 
excluding “original expected applications.”63 
 
The distinction is a simple one. The linguistic meaning of a text is one 
thing, and expectations about the application of that meaning to future cases 
are a different thing. Balkin makes use of the distinction to argue that some 
originalists have conflated meaning with expected applications: 
Originalists generally assume that if we do not apply the constitutional text in the way 
it was originally understood at the time of its adoption we are not following what the 
words mean and so will not be faithful to the Constitution as law. But they have 
tended to conflate two different ideas – the expected application of constitutional 
texts, which is not binding law, and the original meaning, which is. Indeed, many 
originalists who claim to be interested only in original meaning, like Justice Antonin 
Scalia, have encouraged this conflation of original meaning and original expected 
application in their practices of argument.64 
 
                                                
61  See Jack M. Balkin, “Abortion”, supra note 58, at 293; Jack Balkin, “Original 
Meaning”, supra note 59; Jack Balkin, “Alive and Kicking: Why No One Truly 
Believes in a Dead Constitution”, Slate, Aug. 29, 2005, online: 
<http://www.slate.com/id/2125226/>; Jack Balkin, “Clarence Thomas’s 
Originalism”, Balkinization, July 11, 2007, online:<http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2007/07/clarence-thomass-originalism.html>. 
62  Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, “The Meaning of Original Meaning”, 86 
Geo. L.J. 569 (1998).  
63  Balkin, “Original Meaning”, supra note 59 at 446. 
64  Balkin, “Abortion”, supra note 58 at 292–3. 
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The fact that original expected applications are distinct from original 
meanings should not imply that the two are unrelated. Expected applications 
of a text may offer evidence about its meanings, even if these applications are 
neither decisive evidence of meaning nor meaning itself. 
 
Of course, some originalists may contest Balkin’s move and argue that 
original expectations originalism is viable. The justification could be that 
reliance on original expectations is the distinctive characteristic that marks 
originalist theories as originalist.65 But this view appears incorrect given the 
history of originalist thought, and it is certainly contrary to the theories of 
New Originalists like Balkin, Barnett, and Whittington. 
 
Another very recent development is the emergence of what might be 
called “original methods originalism,” the view that the original meaning of 
the Constitution includes the methods of interpretation that the Framers, 
ratifiers, and/or public of the Founding era could, would, or should have 
expected to guide constitutional practice. This view is strongly associated 
with Michael Rappaport and John McGinnis.66 They write: 
[T]he focus of originalism should be on how a reasonable person at the time of the 
Constitution’s adoption would have understand (sic) its words and thought they 
should be interpreted. The Constitution’s provisions were based on commonly 
accepted meanings and the interpretative rules of the time. Some of the provisions had 
clear meanings. Others may have seemed ambiguous, but the enactors would have 
believed that their future application would be based [on] the interpretive rules 
accepted at the time. Thus, their assessment of the meaning and the desirability of the 
Constitution would depend on the interpretive rules that they thought would apply.67 
 
                                                
65  Cf. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (2001) at 25-6 
(characterizing originalism as relying on original expectations). 
66  Their view is stated briefly in John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, 
“Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism”, 24 Const. Comment 
371 (2007). 
67  Ibid. at 374. 
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We can call this approach “original methods originalism,” reflecting its 
commitment to the methods of interpretation that characterized the Founding 
era. Notice that McGinnis and Rappaport’s formulation of their idea does not 
embrace the distinction between interpretation and construction in the 
Whittington/Barnett sense.68 
 
In a different vein, an important contribution to understanding the 
implications of the New Originalism appeared in a 2006 article by Richard 
Fallon, titled “Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional 
Meaning”.69 Fallon does not embrace originalism, but he identified the key 
distinction between the meaning of the Constitution (its semantic content) and 
implementing rules of constitutional law (legal content): 
Despite large apparent differences between originalism and nonoriginalist theories, 
originalist and nonoriginalist judges converge in their decisions surprisingly often. 
Given the strident debates among constitutional theorists, one well might wonder how 
so much agreement could eventuate. The reason, I would suggest, is that what we call 
constitutional theories or theories of constitutional interpretation are often theories 
about constitutional meaning that implicitly accept the permissibility of a disparity 
between constitutional meaning and implementing doctrine. If constitutional theories 
fix the meaning of the Constitution, but stipulate that implementing doctrines 
sometimes permissibly diverge from it, then such theories are less complete and thus 
less practically significant than their proponents suggest.70 
 
Fallon’s distinction between the semantic content of the Constitution 
and the legal content of constitutional law put the following question of 
                                                
68  To the extent that McGinnis and Rappaport believe that original methods 
recover the linguistic meaning or semantic content of the constitutional text, their 
theory faces severe obstacles.  The public linguistic meaning of a text cannot be the 
legal construction that is placed upon that text by legal interpreters.  Legal methods 
operate on the semantic content fixed by linguistic meaning: they do not create it.  
To think otherwise is to confuse meaning in the semantic sense with meaning in the 
applicative sense.  See Lawrence B. Solum, “Semantic Originalism” (November 
22, 2008). Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 07-24. Available at SSRN: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244> 
69  Fallon, “Manageable Standards”, supra note 37; see also Michell N. Berman, 
“Constitutional Decision Rules,” 90 Virginia Law Review 1 (2004). 
70  Ibid. at 1317-18 (citation omitted). 
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contribution on the table: How does the semantic content contribute to legal 
content? 
G. New critics of the new originalism 
The “New Originalism” has sparked a new wave of criticism.71 The first of 
the new critics is Stephen Griffin, the author of “Rebooting Originalism”,72 a 
powerful critique of the New Originalism. Griffin’s critique has thoroughly 
absorbed the theoretical significance of the shift from original intentions to 
original public meaning, but it is not clear that he fully appreciates the 
importance of the Whittington/Barnett distinction between construction and 
interpretation.73 Although Griffin has a variety of important and well-argued 
criticisms of the new originalists, two features of his article are especially 
important for present purposes. First, Griffin’s core argument against the New 
Originalism is normative: he argues that consistent and exclusive use of 
originalist methodology would represent a major change in interpretive 
practice and that originalists must therefore offer a normative justification for 
their theory.74 Second, Griffin’s critique does not consider the possibility that 
original-meaning originalism might include a semantic thesis – a 
nonnormative claim about the linguistic meaning of the Constitution.75 
 
                                                
71 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, “Heller and the New Originalism”, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 609 
(2008). 
72  Stephen M. Griffin, “Rebooting Originalism”, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1185 (2008). 
73  The distinction is never discussed in a theoretical way.  The first mention 
appears on page 34 of his essay.  Ibid. at 1217. 
74  Ibid. at 1196-1205. 
75  No variant of the root word “semantic” appears in Griffin’s article.  Although the 
term “meaning” and its variants appear numerous times, there is no indication that 
Griffin appreciates the possibility that originalism might be a semantic theory. 
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A second new critic is Mitchell Berman, whose critique of originalism 
is tendentiously titled “Originalism is Bunk”.76 Berman’s essay is deep and 
rich, raising some old objections to originalism, providing new foundations 
for others, and developing new positions. One of the crucial moves in his 
piece is his argument that the term “Originalism” (when capitalized) should 
be reserved for the strong claim that original meaning, whatever that might 
be, should trump other considerations in constitutional practice. He 
summarizes this claim as follows: 
Originalism proper is strong originalism–the thesis that original meaning either is the 
only proper target of judicial constitutional interpretation or that it has at least lexical 
priority over any other candidate meanings the text might bear (again, contrary 
judicial precedents possibly excepted). [FN49] It entails (but is not equivalent to) the 
thesis that nothing that transpires after ratification of a particular constitutional 
provision, save a subsequent constitutional amendment, has operative (as opposed to 
evidential) bearing on what courts ought to identify as constitutional meaning.77 
 
Berman’s identification of “Originalism” (with a capital “O”) with what 
he calls “strong originalism” is surely mistaken. For example, Justice Scalia’s 
(paradigmatically originalist) opinion in Heller did not dismiss precedent as 
irrelevant; instead, he argued that the only relevant precedent, United States v. 
Miller,78 was distinguishable.79 
 
In 2006, the New Originalist theorist, Randy Barnett, wrote “Scalia’s 
Infidelity: A Critique of Faint-Hearted Originalism”, which explicitly 
disagrees with Justice Antonin Scalia on the question of force, contending 
that Scalia allows departure from original meaning on the basis of three 
                                                
76  Mitchell N. Berman, “Originalism Is Bunk”, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 at 35 (2009) 
[Berman, “Originalism is Bunk”]. See also Mitchell N. Berman, “Reflective 
Equilibrium and Constitutional Method: Lessons from John McCain and the 
Natural Born Citizenship Clause” in this volume. Stanley Fish criticizes 
“Originalism is Bunk” in “The Intentionalist Thesis Once More” in this volume. 
77  Berman, “Originalism is Bunk”, ibid. at 22. 
78  307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
79  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 at ___, 128 S.Ct. 2783 at 2814 
(2008) [Heller]. 
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factors: (1) precedent, (2) justiciability, and (3) settled historical practice.80 In 
addition to Scalia, originalists of various stripes have taken the position that 
original meaning can be trumped by precedent for a variety of reasons and is 
subject to a variety of constraints, as evidenced by the work of Kurt Lash, Lee 
Strang, and this author.81 
 
Confining “Originalism” (in its focal meaning) to the view that original 
meaning must trump all other considerations is misleading. Moreover, this 
move has the unfortunate effect of defining the topography of argument in a 
way that eliminates plausible forms of originalism from the originalist camp, 
leaving only the most implausible and extreme views in contention. The 
equivalent move by a critic of nonoriginalism would be to define 
“Nonoriginalism” with a capital “N” as the view that “original meaning” in 
any form can never be considered in constitutional interpretation or 
construction. A more productive characterization of the debate might focus on 
three disagreements between originalists and nonoriginalists: (1) debates over 
the question whether the linguistic meaning of the Constitution should be 
viewed as fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified, (2) 
arguments about the relative importance of the original meaning of the text 
versus other considerations, such as purpose, practice, precedent, and 
                                                
80  Randy E. Barnett, “Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” 
Originalism”, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 7 at 13 (2006). 
81  See Lash, “Originalism”, supra note 45 at 1441 (stating that “popular 
sovereignty-based originalism … does not require the complete abandonment of 
stare decisis” and “[a] theory of stare decisis that takes into account the 
majoritarian commitment of popular sovereignty may justify upholding an 
erroneous precedent”); Lawrence B. Solum, “The Supreme Court in Bondage: 
Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future Of Unenumerated 
Rights”, 9 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 155 at 159 (2006) (arguing for originalist theory that 
gives trumping force to precedent); Lee J. Strang, “An Originalist Theory of 
Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good”, 36 
N.M. L. Rev. 419 at 420 (2006) (offering originalist theory in which “limited 
respect is due some nonoriginalist constitutional precedent”). 
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principles, and (3) differences over the extent to which constitutional 
construction is constrained by the linguistic meaning of the text. 
 
A third source of new criticism is Living Originalism,82 jointly authored 
by Thomas Colby and Peter Smith. They state their argument boldly: 
In fact, just as with nonoriginalism, there is profound internal disagreement on the 
originalist side of the line. A review of originalists’ work reveals originalism to be not 
a single, coherent, unified theory of constitutional interpretation, but rather a 
smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories that share little in common except a 
misleading reliance on a single label.83 
 
The question that Smith and Colby raise is an important one, and we 
shall return to it in Part IV of this chapter. 
 
H. District of Columbia v. Heller & McDonald v. City of Chicago 
Supreme Court decisions that squarely address the fundamental issues of 
constitutional theory are rare, but District of Columbia v. Heller84 is such a 
decision. The key passage in the majority opinion is unmistakably originalist: 
 
In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution 
was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their 
normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.85  
 
The implications of the majority’s conclusion that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual right to possess and carry weapons were 
disputed by Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer in their dissenting opinions. 
Justice Stevens, in particular, offered a lengthy dissent, focusing in part on the 
                                                
82 Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, “Living Originalism”, 59 Duke L.J. 239 
(2009) [Colby and Smith, “Living Originalism”]. 
83 Ibid. at 244. 
84   Heller, supra note 79. 
85  Ibid. at 2788 (citations omitted). 
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purposes that animated the Second Amendment and raising a number of 
arguments relevant to the original intentions of the Framers.86 
 
The majority opinion in Heller covers a good deal of territory, much of 
it contested by the dissents, but, for the purpose of completing this brief 
survey of the contemporary development of originalist theory, the important 
feature of Heller is methodological. The Court examined each of the 
operative words and phrases in the Second Amendment, examining the 
semantic content of “the people,” “keep,” “bear,” and “arms.” The Court 
concluded its examination as follows: “Putting all of these textual elements 
together, we find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry 
weapons in case of confrontation.”87 In examining each of the operative words 
and phrases, the Court examined evidence of usage from the period the 
Second Amendment was proposed and ratified. For example: 
 
Before addressing the verbs “keep” and “bear,” we interpret their object: “Arms.” The 
18th-century meaning is no different from the meaning today. The 1773 edition of 
Samuel Johnson’s dictionary defined “arms” as “weapons of offence, or armour of 
defence.” Timothy Cunningham’s important 1771 legal dictionary defined “arms” as 
“any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath 
to cast at or strike another.”88 
 
Another example:  
The phrase “keep arms” was not prevalent in the written documents of the founding 
period that we have found, but there are a few examples, all of which favor viewing 
the right to “keep Arms” as an individual right unconnected with militia service. 
William Blackstone, for example, wrote that Catholics convicted of not attending 
service in the Church of England suffered certain penalties, one of which was that 
they were not permitted to “keep arms in their houses.”89 
 
Additionally:  
                                                
86  See, e.g., ibid. at 2837 n.28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
87  Ibid. at 2797 (majority opinion). 
88  Ibid. at 2791 (citations omitted). 
89  Ibid. at 2792 (citations omitted). 
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At the time of the founding, as now, to ‘bear’ meant to ‘carry.’90 
 
Bracketing the question as to whether Heller’s analysis of the linguistic 
evidence was correct, the methodology of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion 
was clear: the Court focused on the evidence of the original public meaning 
of the text. Given the inevitable differences between judicial practice and 
constitutional theory, it is hard to imagine finding a clearer example of 
original public meaning originalism in an actual judicial decision. 
Heller is not the Supreme Court’s last word on originalism and the right 
to bear arms.  In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court addressed 
the question whether the Second Amendment right to bear arms applies to the 
states.91  This question implicates a long-standing constitutional controversy.  
Many originalists believe that the application of the Bill of Rights (including 
the Second Amendment) to the states should be grounded in the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Supreme Court’s 
decisions have settled on the Due Process Clause as the basis for what is 
called “incorporation.”92  Although Justice Alito’s plurality opinion contains 
originalist passages, it relies on the nonoriginalist approach.93  Justice 
Thomas’s concurring opinion, which provided the crucial fifth vote, rested 
incorporation on the Privileges or Immunities Clause instead.94 
If Heller was a clear endorsement of originalism, McDonald is a mixed 
message at best.  Prominent originalists, including Randy Barnett, have 
praised Justice Thomas’s concurrence and criticized the majority.95  But the 
                                                
90  Ibid. at 2793 (citation omitted). 
91 561 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010). 
92 See generally Lawrence B. Solum, “Incorporation and Originalist Theory,” 18 J. 
Contemp. L. Issues 409, 412 (2009). 
93 130 S.Ct. at 3030-31 (Alito, J., plurality opinion). 
94 130 S.Ct. 3059 (Opinon of Thomas, J., concurring). 
95 See Randy Barnett, The Supreme Court’s Gun Showdown, Wall Street Journal, 
June 29, 2010, 
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relationship of McDonald to originalism is not a simple one.  On the one 
hand, McDonald could be read as compatible with an originalism that makes 
an exception for deeply entrenched precedent.  On the other hand, skeptics 
might read McDonald as reflecting antipathy (among the plurality justices) 
for any doctrine that would legitimate unenumerated rights. 
 
IV. What is Originalism? 
The question “What is originalism?,” is itself ambiguous? One version of the 
question asks, “What is the meaning of the word “originalism?” The answer 
to that question is that the word is now ambiguous – having several different 
related senses in both scholarly and popular discourse. A second version of 
the questions is, “What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for content 
of a constitutional theory to qualify as ‘originalist’?” That question should be 
taken off the table of serious scholarly inquiry. Originalism is not a natural 
kind; the term “originalism” is not used to point to the single true and correct 
version of originalist theory. It is simply not the case that the theories that we 
call “originalist” all share some set of essential characteristics. A third version 
of the question might be, “Which member of the family of originalist theories 
should be designated (or stipulated) as “originalism” (with or without a 
capital “O”) for the purpose of theoretical discussion among constitutional 
theorists?” Although it would be possible to pursue the project of reaching 
agreement on this question, there are substantial obstacles to be overcome. No 
person or institution has authority to settle questions of usage in constitutional 
theory. There are powerful incentives for advocates and opponents of 
different forms of originalism (both inside and outside the academy) to use 




the term “originalism” in ways that advance their practical or theoretical 
agendas. None of these three versions of the what-is-originalism question 
identifies a fruitful line of inquiry. 
 
Does the fact that originalism is a family of theories that cannot be 
explicated via a series of necessary and sufficient conditions entail the further 
conclusion that the question, “What is originalism?,” should be abandoned 
altogether? Before we answer that question in the affirmative, we could 
consider the possibility that the family of originalist theories can be described 
systematically. We may be able to develop a systematic account of the 
similarities and differences among the varieties of originalism, and that 
account might allow us to identify themes or core ideas that most (if not all) 
originalists share. 
 
For example, different versions of originalism offer different accounts 
of the determinants of original meaning. A rigorously developed typology 
would require a systematic investigation of all the relevant texts, but an 
informal survey suggests that the following versions of originalism would 
figure prominently: (1) original intentions originalism (the view that the 
meaning of the text is determined by the intentions of its authors), with 
subvariants for: (a) framers’ intentions, (b) ratifiers’ intentions, and (c) 
framers and ratifiers’ intentions; (2) original public meaning originalism (the 
view that the meaning of the text is determined by the conventional semantic 
meaning of the words and phrases at the time each provision was framed and 
ratified); (3) original methods originalism (the view that the original meaning 
is the meaning that would have been derived given the methods of 
interpretation (and possibly also construction) that were employed at the time 
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each provision was framed and ratified. Doubtless, there are further 
variations, both within these three clusters and outside them. 
 
The diversity of theories about the determinants of original meaning 
does not entail the further conclusion that there is no agreement among 
originalists. Originalists disagree about the question as to what determines 
original meaning (intentions, public meanings, methods), but all or almost all 
of the originalist writing with which I am familiar agrees on the question as to 
when meaning is fixed. Original intentions originalists agree that the relevant 
intentions are those of the framers or ratifiers of each provision of the 
Constitution: thus, the original meaning of the Constitution of 1789 was fixed 
by facts about intentions from the period that starts with the opening of the 
Philadelphia Convention and ends when the ratification process was 
completed. Original public meaning originalists agree that the conventional 
semantic meaning of the words and phrases should also be determined by 
linguistic facts at the time each constitutional provision was framed and 
ratified. And a similar conclusion holds of original methods originalists. 
 
This pattern of agreement suggests that most or almost all originalists 
agree that original meaning was fixed or determined at the time each 
provision of the constitution was framed and ratified. We might call this idea 
the fixation thesis. It is no surprise that originalists agree on the fixation 
thesis. The term “originalism” was coined to describe a family of textualist 
and intentionalist approaches to constitutional interpretation and construction 
that were associated with phrases like “original intentions,” “original 
meaning,” and “original understanding.” These phrases and the word 
“originalist” share the root word “origin.” The idea that meaning is fixed at 
the time of origination for each constitutional provision serves as the common 
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denominator for all off these expressions. Thus, the fixation thesis might be 
described as a core idea, around which all or almost all originalist theories 
organize themselves. 
 
Almost all originalist theories are theories of constitutional practice – 
they have something to say about how officials (especially judges and 
paradigmatically Justices of the United States Supreme Court) should 
interpret and construe the Constitution. Although it would be theoretically 
possible for an originalist theory to limit itself to the purely linguistic claim 
that the semantic content of the Constitution is fixed at the time of origin of 
each provision, almost all self-identified originalists make further claims 
about the implications of that fact for constitutional practice. 
 
The variations among originalists in this second dimension can be 
clarified by marking a distinction between semantic content and legal content. 
The semantic content of the constitutional text is the linguistic meaning of the 
document. But the term “meaning” is itself ambiguous. The constitutional 
text has a linguistic meaning, but that meaning is distinct from the legal 
implications of the text. Because we sometimes use the word “meaning” to 
describe such implications, the “meaning of the Constitution” can refer to set 
of legal rules (the body of constitutional doctrine) that mediates between the 
text and the decision of particular cases. The legal content of the 
constitutional doctrine is simply the set or rules developed by courts (and 
other officials) for the application of the text to particular cases. 
 
Although originalists agree that the semantic content of the Constitution 
was fixed at the time each provision was framed and ratified, they disagree 
about the role that semantic content plays in determining legal content. In 
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other words, different originalists have different views about the constraining 
force of original meaning. At one end of the spectrum, an originalist might 
believe that each and every rule of constitutional law must be identical to the 
original meaning of some provision of the Constitution. On that view, much 
of the content of contemporary constitutional doctrine would be illegitimate: 
since it seems clear that wide swaths of constitutional law are judicial 
creations. A more moderate (but still quite strong) version of originalism 
might adopt the view that constitutional doctrine cannot contradict the 
original meaning, but allow for the development of supplementary rules (for 
example, in the case of constitutional provisions that are vague). Further 
along the spectrum, some originalists might adopt the position that the 
original meaning should constrain constitutional doctrine, but allow for 
circumstances in which exceptions are legitimate. One such exception might 
focus on the role of precedent: some originalists may believe that the 
Supreme Court may legitimately adhere to precedents that are at variation 
with the original meaning of the text, where the restoration of the original 
meaning would be disruptive, upset justifiable reliance, and so forth. An even 
more modest version of originalism might take the position that the original 
meaning should govern in cases of first impression, but sanction departures 
from original meaning whenever a question of legal doctrine has been settled. 
A very weak version of originalism might require officials (such as judges) to 
consider the original meaning as one important factor in the determination of 
constitutional doctrine, but allow the original meaning to be balanced with a 
variety of other considerations, including precedent, contemporary social 
interests and values, and so forth.  At this end of the spectrum, originalism 
will begin to merge with forms of living constitutionalism that acknowledge 




Although the originalists may disagree about the constraining force of 
original meaning, all or almost all originalists agree that original meaning 
ought to play an important and substantial role in the determination of 
constitutional doctrine. Characteristically, originalists believe that the role of 
original meaning should be constraining – that is, that absent exceptional 
circumstances (or very weighty reasons), constitutional doctrines that 
contradict or contravene the semantic content of the Constitution (as fixed at 
the time of origin) are illegitimate. This pattern of agreement and variation 
suggests a second idea that forms the core around which originalist theories 
are organized. All or almost all originalists agree that the original meaning of 
the Constitution should make a substantial contribution to the content of 
constitutional doctrine: we might call this idea, the contribution thesis. Most 
originalists agree on a fairly strong version of the contribution thesis, which 
we might call the constraint principle (constitutional doctrine must be 
consistent with original meaning absent very weighty reasons). The 
contribution thesis forms a second core idea, around which different versions 
of originalism cluster. The constraint principle identifies an important nexus 
in that cluster – the mainstream of contemporary originalist theory. 
 
Originalists differ in yet another important respect. Different versions of 
originalist theory provide different justifications for the constraining force of 
original meaning. Some originalists emphasize the rule of law. Others focus 
on the idea of popular sovereignty. Yet others emphasize the notion that the 
conventions of legal practice do not permit judges to deliberately overrule the 
linguistic meaning of the constitutional text. And still others may make the 
claim that adherence to original meaning is justified because it will produce 
better decisions in the long run than the alternative methods of constitutional 
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interpretation and construction. It seems likely that many originalists will rely 
on some combination of these arguments, and others as well. 
 
Of course these variations in the justifications for originalism are 
important, but the existence of variations at the level of normative foundation 
is to be expected, given the pluralism that characterizes the public culture of 
the American polity in general and the academy in particular.  Disagreement 
at the level of ultimate normative foundations is perfectly consistent with 
agreement on core originalist principles as an operative judicial philosophy. 
 
What is originalism? Within the domain of constitutional theory, 
originalism is a family of views that cluster around two central ideas, the 
fixation thesis and the contribution thesis. All or almost all originalists agree 
that the original meaning of the Constitution was fixed at the time each 
provision was framed and ratified. Almost all originalists agree that original 
meaning must make an important contribution to the content of constitutional 
doctrine: most originalists agree that courts should view themselves as 
constrained by original meaning and that very good reasons are required for 
legitimate departures from that constraint. 
 
What then should we make of Colby and Smith’s claim that originalism 
is “a smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories that share little in 
common except a misleading reliance on a single label”?96 Colby and Smith 
are certainly correct that the term “originalism” is not used to describe a 
single theoretical position characterized by strong agreement among its 
proponents on all the important constituent elements. But this does not entail 
the conclusion that the only thing that unifies most (or even almost all) 
                                                
96 Colby & Smith, “Living Originalism”, supra note 82 at 244. 
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originalist theories is “misleading reliance on a single label.” The two ideas 
that provide the focal point of agreement among almost all originalist 
theories, the fixation thesis and the contribution thesis, are directly and 
transparently related to the label, “originalism,” and the cognate notions of 
“original meaning” or “original understanding.” Originalists agree that the 
“meaning” (the semantic content or linguistic meaning) of the constitutional 
text was fixed at the time that each provision of the constitution was framed 
and ratified. The fixation thesis expresses the idea that the “origin” or “time 
of origination” of each constitutional provision fix its meaning, which 
originalists call the “original meaning.” There is nothing misleading about the 
use of the term “originalism” as the label for this view. Moreover, the family 
of originalist theories is organized around another central idea, the fixation 
thesis and its strong variant, the constraint principle. Almost all originalists 
agree that the original meaning ought to make a substantial and important 
contribution to constitutional doctrine, and most originalists make the 
stronger claim that this contribution ought to constrain constitutional doctrine 
(absent very good reasons for departure from the original meaning). 
 
What about the important differences that remain? Does the fact that 
originalists disagree about important matters somehow ground an argument 
against the validity of the best versions of originalist theory? Initially, it is 
difficult to see how this argument might go. Colby and Smith are certainly 
correct to the extent that they argue that originalism cannot claim strong 
theoretical unity as a virtue – to the extent that originalists have made that 
claim they are simply incorrect. Originalism is a family of theories that 
cluster around the fixation thesis and the contribution thesis – not a single 
theory whose proponents agree on all the important details. 
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But from the fact that originalists almost all agree about two core ideas 
but disagree about much else, it does not follow that no version of originalism 
is correct. Consider the analogous situation that holds in the natural sciences. 
Suppose that at one stage in the development of the theory of evolution, there 
were competing accounts of the mechanism by which natural selection 
actually occurred. (Until the discovery of DNA, the actual mechanism was 
uncertain.) From this fact, it would surely not follow that no version of the 
theory of evolution could be true or that competing versions of the theory 
were united only by a “misleading label.” The more sensible response to 
theoretical disagreement is to ask the question, “Which version of the theory 
is right, correct, or best?” The argument that evolution must be wrong 
because evolutionary biologists disagree about important questions is simply 
a subtle variation on the genetic fallacy (no pun intended). 
 
The originalist family of theories is actually relatively immature as 
academic theories go. One might read the progression from original intentions 
of the framers to the understandings of the ratifiers to the original public 
meaning of the text as a story of increasing fracture and degeneration, but the 
same narrative may eventually come to be seen as a story of progress and 
increasing sophistication. 
 
Perhaps the most worrisome and most persistent disagreement among 
originalists is the one tacitly identified by Brest when he coined the term 
“originalism” – originalists continue to disagree about the role of “original 
intentions” and “original public meaning.” Colby and Smith emphasize this 
worry: 
[O]riginalists’ specific claims that their approach alone properly treats the 
Constitution as a form of law and properly limits the judiciary to its appropriate role 
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in a democratic society . . . start from the premise that originalism (and only 
originalism) treats the Constitution as having a fixed and determinate meaning. Yet 
the meaning that a committed originalist judge would find obviously turns on the 
particular brand of originalism that the judge applies. And over the last thirty-five 
years, that meaning has been anything but fixed. A judge committed to the originalist 
enterprise would once have invoked original intent, and would today have the freedom 
to choose from a smorgasbord that includes original intent and many other originalist 
approaches.97 
 
Colby and Smith exaggerate to the extent that they claim that 
theoretical divergence among originalists would give judges discretion to pick 
and choose among originalist theories – each judge would be bound across 
cases to employ the theory she believed was correct, but the essence of their 
point is correct: there are real and substantial differences between the 
competing versions of originalist theory. 
 
But the importance of the disagreement between intentionalist and 
public-meaning originalists should not be exaggerated. The form of 
intentionalism that has emerged in recent years emphasizes the semantic 
intentions of the authors of the constitutional text – best understood as a 
complex combination of the framers and ratifiers. The view is that the 
linguistic meaning of the text is a function of the intentions (or mental states) 
of its authors. Public meaning originalism takes the view that the linguistic 
meaning of the constitutional text is a function of its conventional semantic 
meaning – which is determined by patterns of usage among the relevant 
linguistic community. 
 
It is possible for intended meaning and public meaning to diverge, but 
in the case of a legal text, such divergence will be rare in practice. The 
authors of the constitutional text knew that those who would read and 
                                                
97 Ibid. at 283. 
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interpret the text would have limited access to information about idiosyncratic 
semantic intentions: for example, the records of the Philadelphia convention 
and the ratifying conventions were not publicly available in the era that 
immediately followed ratification. For this reason, the semantic intentions of 
the ratifiers are likely to closely track original public meaning – a point that is 
recognized by sophisticated originalists of both the intentionalist and public-
meaning varieties. And it is no surprise that this divide in originalist theory is 
accompanied by agreement (in principle) in application. Originalist theory 
must account for linguistic facts on the ground – and this means that such 
theories must converge in order to adequately account for the relevant 
evidence. 
V. Originalism and Living Constitutionalism 
The chief aim of this chapter is a modest one, to lay a foundation that can 
help to clarify and sharpen debates about originalist constitutional theory. The 
strategy has been to address the question, “What is originalism?,” in the 
context of the evolution or development of originalist theory. In this 
penultimate section of the chapter, these efforts will be applied to the debate 
between originalists and living constitutionalists. 
 
The first and perhaps the most important point is that it misleading to 
characterize controversies between originalists and living constitutionalists as 
a single debate. There are several versions of originalism, and it seems likely 
that there are many versions of “living constitutionalism.” The first best 
approach to that fact would involve an investigation of “living 
constitutionalism” that parallels the exploration of originalism undertaken in 
this chapter, but on this occasion, we must settle for the second best approach 
by relying on a representative example of living constitutionalism as a 
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starting point. Justice William Brennan of the United States Supreme Court 
offered an influential formulation of living constitutionalism: 
To remain faithful to the content of the Constitution, therefore, an approach to 
interpreting the text must account for the existence of the substantive value choices 
and must accept the ambiguity inherent in the effort to apply them to modern 
circumstances. The Framers discerned fundamental principles through struggles 
against particular malefactions of the Crown: the struggle shapes the particular 
contours of the articulated principles. But our acceptance of the fundamental 
principles has not and should not bind us to those precise, at times anachronistic, 
contours.98 
 
Brennan’s formulation allows us to identify two ideas that are 
associated with living constitutionalism. The first idea is that constitutional 
principles must be adapted to changing circumstances. The freedoms of 
speech and of the press at the time of the framing and ratification of the First 
Amendment had “particular contours” adapted to the communications 
technologies of the late-Eighteenth century. These principles will take on 
different contours when applied to the early Twenty-First Century world of 
the Internet. The second idea is somewhat different, and might be at odds 
with Brennan’s formulation. One might believe that constitutional practice 
should reflect changing values as well as changing circumstances. On this 
view, the set of “fundamental principles” might grow and change, while the 
constitutional text remains the same. 
 
Are living constitutionalism and originalism competing theories? That 
question can and should be reformulated as a series of inquiries. Are some 
versions of originalism consistent with living constitutionalism? Are other 
versions incompatible? Once the question is reformulated in this way, it 
becomes clear that there are both compatibilist and incompatibilist stories to 
tell about the relationship between living constitutionalism and originalism. 
                                                
98 William J. Brennan, Jr., “The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification”, 27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 433 at 437 (1986). 
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The compatibilist story about the relationship between living 
constitutionalism and originalism can be articulated via the distinction 
between constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction that is 
associated with the New Originalism. Compatibilism could be the view that 
originalism and living constitutionalism have separate domains. Originalism 
has constitutional interpretation as its domain: the linguistic meaning of the 
Constitution is fixed. Living constitutionalism has constitutional construction 
as its domain: the vague provisions of the constitution can be given 
constructions that change over time in order to adapt to changing values and 
circumstances. A fully specified living constitutionalism would have to 
provide a theory of constitutional construction that satisfies this description, 
and we can imagine that there could be a variety of such theories. 
 
If living constitutionalism accepts the fixation thesis, some theory of 
semantic content, and some version of the contribution thesis, then living 
constitutionalism is committed to the idea that the constitutional text provides 
constitutional law a hard core. Originalists and some living constitutionalists 
could agree that the hard core of determinant constitutional meaning should 
not yield to changing circumstances and values and agree that in the 
“construction zone” created by the abstract, vague, and general provisions of 
the text, constitutional doctrine can “live” and “grow” in response to 
changing circumstances and values. 
 
But some living constitutionalist may deny that there is a hard core. 
They might believe that even the core of constitutional law is malleable and 
subject to manipulation. That is, they might assert that the living constitution 
has a soft core. What then about incompatibilism? 
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There are at least two different ways in which living constitutionalism 
could make assertions that are inconsistent with originalism. One possibility 
is that living constitutionalism is a theory of linguistic meaning. That is, 
living constitutionalists could be understood as denying the fixation thesis 
and asserting that the semantic meaning of a given constitutional provision 
changes in response to changing circumstances. But there is another version 
of living constitutionalism that would result in incompatibilism. Some living 
constitutionalists may deny what I have called the constraint principle. This 
version of living constitutionalism could accept the claims made by the most 
modest versions of originalism (for example, that original meaning should be 
an important factor in the determination of constitutional doctrine) but deny 
the claim that original meaning should strongly constrain judicial 
interpretation and construction of the Constitution. This view can be stated 
somewhat tendentiously to bring out the feature that creates the 
incompatibility. Some living constitutionalists may believe that courts should 
have the power to amend the Constitution in order to eliminate what Justice 
Brennan might have called the “anachronistic contours” of the constitutional 
text. Proponents of this view are not likely to use the word “amendment” to 
describe this power but that word seems an accurate characterization of the 
implications of their position. 
 
Of course, this account of compatibilist and incompatibilist stories 
about originalism and living constitutionalism is only a sketch. Filling it out 
would require a careful reconstruction of the actual positions held by various 
participants in contemporary debates about constitutional theory. The sketch 
was offered to illustrate the importance of clarity in these debates. If we begin 
with the assumption that originalism must be incompatible with living 
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constitutionalism, that assumption may well obscure the most important 
issues. Originalists and living constitutionalists may find common ground on 
very issues that they believe are the heart of the controversy. Once these 
misconceptions are cleared away, the new ground for contestation may look a 




One of the goals of this chapter has been to motivate a reorientation of the 
debates about originalism in constitutional theory. Constitutional theory can 
be practiced as politics by other means. Originalism can be viewed as the 
“conservative” theory, and living constitutionalism as the “liberal theory,” but 
that picture is oversimplified at best. There is an alternative to the 
politicization of constitutional theory. Originalism and living 
constitutionalism can be debated on the intellectual merits, but that will only 
occur if participants in the debates view these theories in their best light and 
apply the principle of charity to the arguments of their opponents. 
 
“Originalism” is an ambiguous term. The family of contemporary 
originalist constitutional theories contains substantial diversity, and there may 
be no single thesis upon which all self-described originalists agree. Despite 
the variety of originalist theories, there are two central ideas that serve as the 
focal point or core of contemporary originalism. Almost all originalists agree 
that the original meaning of the Constitution was fixed at the time each 
provision was framed and ratified. Most originalists agree that the original 
meaning of the Constitution should strongly constrain the content of 
constitutional doctrine. 
